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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a public policy against unconscionability and overreaching in any credit
transaction.' A trial court could weigh all the circumstances surrounding
a transaction in light of current economic conditions and thus determine
whether the profit reserved was palpably unfair as well as the result of
unconscionable activity by the creditor. The court's finding of unconscion-
able usury should carry a penalty severe enough to make such practices
unprofitable, but not so severe as to make the courts reluctant to impose
them.
Such a statutory scheme of complete' disclosure, of continuing regula-
tion where most needed and of flexible enforcement of public policy would
not become a stultified vestige of the past, as has the present law, but
would conform itself to the changing economic needs of the future.
DAVID MCDANIEL MOORE II
Antitrust-"Cross-Media" Ownership and the Antitrust Laws-
A Critical Analysis and a Suggested Solution
INTRODUCTION
For many years newspapers have owned broadcast stations' competing
in the same metropolitan area, but only recently has concern been ex-
19 Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Whether a mean-
ingful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined by con-
sideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. . . . The
manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this considera-
tion....
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Corbin suggests the test should be whether the terms are "so extreme as to appear
unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time and place."
1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1963). In this connection, it should be noted that
the North Carolina General Assembly omitted U.C.C. § 2-302, which enacts the un-
conscionability doctrine as to sales, from the North Carolina version of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965), and that
the North Carolina Supreme Court has never explicitly applied the unconscion-
ability doctrine. An early decision stated that equity would set aside a contract
"grossly against conscience or grossly unreasonable." Barnett v. Spratt, 39 N.C.
171, 174 (1845) (dictum). A later case has produced a result, based upon con-
sideration theory, which seems justifiable only upon grounds of unconscionability.
Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N.C. 330, 135 S.E. 141 (1926).
1 The broadcast media under consideration will be AM and FM radio and VHF
and UHF television. The "duopoly" rules adopted by the FCC restrict ownership
by one person of AM, FM, and television stations to one station of each type in
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pressed2 about such "cross-media' ownership.3 As the inclusion of the
freedom of press in the Bill of Rights indicates, the American people have
long realized that truth has its best chance of emerging in the "market-
any one area. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(a), 73.240(a) (1), 73.636(a)(1) (1968). Since
community antenna television (CATV) does not generally compete for local com-
mercial advertising, it will not be directly considered. However, as a potential
competitor with the other media, the consequences of its entry will be noted. Al-
though the FCC has issued no "duopoly" rules for CATV, it is doubtful that a
party will operate competing systems since CATV can offer several channels with-
in a single system.
The FCC has proposed a rule to prohibit ownership of more than one television
or radio station of any kind in the same market. FCC Dkt. No. 18110 (1968).
Since its application would be prospective, it would affect only future applicants for
licenses and not current licensees applying for renewal. The Justice Department,
however, has urged that the Commission consider the possibility of extending the
policy to renewal proceedings. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 369
(1968).
- Although there have been a few antitrust cases involving newspaper ownership
of broadcast media, it was not until 1968 that the Antitrust Division urged the
FCC to consider possible antitrust violations in an upcoming hearing. The occasion
for this intervention was the proposed transfer of a license for a television station
in Beaumont, Texas, to the publisher of the city's only newspaper. BNA ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. No. 357 (1968).
Antitrust litigation involving the problem of concentration of newspaper owner-
ship has been a much more frequent occurrence. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co.
v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 4208 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1969). For a general discussion
of the problem, see Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper Industry, 82
HARv. L. REv. 319 (1968).
"Cross-media" ownership for purposes of this comment is defined as newspaper
ownership of one or more broadcast media. Statistics show that the problem is not
insubstantial.
[I]n 85 cities ... the only daily newspaper owns an interest in the only AM
station. In 78 cities newspapers own majority interests. Only 14 of these
85 cities are in metropolitan areas where listeners receive some measure of
local radio service as an alternate....
B. RucxER, THE FIRsT FREEDOM 192 (1968) [hereinafter cited as RUCKER]. In
another fifty-one cities the only daily newspaper holds ownership in one of two
AM stations. Id. On a national level 9.5 percent of all AM stations are affiliated
with a newspaper, and 13.5 percent of all FM stations are affiliated with a news-
paper. Id. 237. Of course, the affiliated newspapers included in these percentages
are not necessarily in the same market as the broadcast media.
Furthermore, newspaper-television monopolies exist in twenty-seven cities, and
in seventeen of these twenty-seven cities, unless the cities' residents installed tall
outside antennas or subscribed to CATV, residents received no other television ser-
vice. Id. 195. In another seventeen cities, the only daily newspaper owned a share
of one of the only two local television stations. Id. In the top ten television markets,
which, incidentally, include almost forty percent of all television households, thirty-
seven of the forty VHF stations are owned by chain broadcasters and ten of the
forty are licensed to companies that own newspapers. Id. 196. Nationally, 29.4 per-
cent of all television stations are owned by newspapers. Id. 237.
In 1966, out of 1,503 franchises for CATV that had been granted, newspapers
had interests in approximately 225, and 300 more newspapers were seeking fran-
chises. Id. 176, 181.
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place of thought." Yet the ownership of institutions charged with pro-
viding this competition-the mass media-has become so concentrated that
the free interchange of ideas may no longer be possible.4 In such a situa-
tion, inadequate news coverage seems a likely result, and even blatant news
management a distinct possibility.' Further, there is elimination of compe-
tition not only in the market of ideas, but also in the market for commercial
advertising. Offering package rates at a large discount may become
common;0 and, even more seriously, tying arrangements could develop
whereby to advertise in a newspaper it would be necessary to confine
advertising in broadcast media to those owned by the newspaper.' Regard-
less of whether there are anticompetitive practices, when a well-known
newspaper commences operations of a broadcast station, it will necessarily
get a competitive advantage over other media through "transferred good
will."' Furthermore, in the aesthetic realm, cross-media ownership creates
the possibility of less imaginative programming by broadcast stations and
less innovative reporting by newspapers.
The purpose of this comment is to discuss how cross-media ownership
has been handled in the past by the Federal Communications Commission,
to point out and discuss possible modes of attack under the existing anti-
trust laws, and to suggest a possible solution to this major problem.0
FCC CONSIDERATION OF NEWSPAPER OWNERSHIP
The FCC is charged with the administrative task of licensing and
supervising telecommunications facilities under the mandate of serving
"public convenience, interest, or necessity."'" Its determinations are made
'Ernst, Introduction to RUCKER at xvi.
On issues of local importance, it would be disturbing if there were a common
editorial policy by substantially all the local media, especially in cities where all
the newspapers are controlled by one company.
Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest: Administrative Responsi-
bility of the FCC, 66 YALE L.J. 365, 367 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Diversification and the Public Interest].
'See, e.g., Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957). Cross-media ownership could create rather
strong psychological barriers to new entry into the market because of the combined
power and advantages, the threat of tie-ins, and the possibility of package rate
discounts.
'P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 534-35 (1967).
9 Except to the extent that they affect cross-media ownership, the potential anti-
competitive effects of chain ownership of the mass media will not be discussed.
Similarly, concentration of ownership of the daily newspapers in a metropolitan area
will be germane to this comment only with respect to the effects on cross-media
ownership.
'47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1964).
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on three basic occasions: when granting licenses;:" when renewing li-
censes;12 and when approving license transfers.1 3 Consideration of news-
paper ownership of an applicant station has depended on whether there was
a sole applicant or a comparative proceeding."4 Satisfying only the mini-
mum statutory requirements and the multiple ownership rules 5 virtually
assured the sole applicant of success. 6 When granting a license in a com-
parative proceeding, however, the Commission has repeatedly stated that
diversification of media ownership is a factor to be considered.' 7 Yet
diversification has apparently never been considered when approving
license transfers,'" and until recently was given little weight in license
renewal hearings."
Though the importance of the diversification factor in granting licenses
has been uncertain,2" during the 1950's and 1960's some relatively stable
"Id.
"Id. § 307(d).
"Id. § 310(b).
14 The comparative proceeding is an administrative hearing wherein selection
between competing applicants for a single license authorization is made. Comment,
Diversification anid the Public Interest 373; cf. 47 U.S.C. §§ 309, 409 (1964).
" Multiple ownership rules are of two types: "duopoly" rules, discussed in note 1
mipra, and "concentration of control" rules. The latter provide that no party may
operate, hold, or control an interest in more than seven AM, seven FM, and seven
television stations, no more than five of the television stations being VHF. 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.35(b), 73.240(a) (2), 73.636(a) (2) (1968). The "concentration of
control" rules, though espousing diversification policy, are concerned only with intra-
medium holdings and abuses.
1 Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest 382. But cf. Mansfield
Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (refusal to enfranchise sole appli-
cant because of flagrant predatory practices).
"E.g., Cherokee Broadcasting Co., 25 F.C.C. 92 (1958). See generally Heck-
man, Diversification of Control of the Media of Mass Communication--Policy or
Fallacy.P, 42 GEo. L.J. 378, 380 (1954); Toohey, Newspaper Ownership of Broad-
cast Facilities, 20 FED. Com. B.J. 44, 45 (1966). The first reference to the question
of newspaper ownership of broadcast facilities in Commission cases was in the
dissenting opinion in United States Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C. 208, 240 (1936).See Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest 386.
'
9 WHDH, Inc., 37 U.S.L.W. 2429 (FCC Jan. 23, 1969), was apparently the
first renewal hearing wherein diversification was instrumental in denying a license
renewal. See also Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest 379.
" The newspaper owner prevailed in many cases. Town Talk Broadcasting Co.,
11 F.C.C. 919 (1947); Capitol Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 859 (1947); Orlando
Daily Newspapers, Inc., 11 F.C.C. 760 (1946).
On the other hand, the unaffiliated applicant was frequently successful. Sandusky
Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 1383 (1947); Central Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 1310
(1947); City of Sebring, 11 F.C.C. 873 (1947); Voice of Augusta, Inc., 11 F.C.C.
733 (1946); Daytona Beach Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 679 (1946); Nashville
Radio Corp., 11 F.C.C. 639 (1946); Royal Miller Radio, 11 F.C.C. 236 (1946);
Southern Tier Radio Serv., Inc., 11 F.C.C. 171 (1946).
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policies developed." In a comparative proceeding newspaper ownership
is a discrediting factor,22 but not a disqualifying one.m Its importance
will depend upon the nature and extent of newspaper interests of the
applicant.24 It will be decisive only where the other comparative criteria
have been equally met by the applicants.2 5 Furthermore, where a single
party applies for a particular license, there will be no hearing except where
collateral public interest matters, such as suppression of competition, are
material.26
Apparently the first renewal hearing where the diversification criterion
was recognized as bearing substantially on the public interest was WHDH,
ITc.27 in January, 1969. There the FCC in a totally unprecedented
move28 said that since the incumbent's operating record did not dem-
onstrate "unusual attention to the public's needs or interests, 20 it would
" The conclusions stated in this paragraph were reached in Toohey, Newspaper
Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 20 FED. Com. B.J. 44, 52 (1966).
2' The other factors traditionally considered in a comparative proceeding are:
local ownership; integration of ownership and management; diversification of the
backgrounds of the owners; participation in civic affairs; proposed programming;
proposed program policies; carefulness of operational planning; relative likelihood
of effectuation of proposals; broadcast experience; past broadcast record; technical
facilities; staffing; violations of law and other reflections on character; and areas
and populations to be served. W. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES, 1081-84 (1967).
2" Cherokee Broadcasting Co., 25 F.C.C. 92 (1958); WHEC, Inc., 24 F.C.C.
147 (1958) ; Hi-Line Broadcasting Co., 22 F.C.C. 891 (1957) ; Indianapolis Broad-
casting, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 421 (1957).
2" Greater Princeton Broadcasting Co., 32 F.C.C. 389 (1962) ; Florida Gulfcoast
Broadcasters, Inc., 32 F.C.C. 197 (1962); WIBC, Inc., 31 F.C.C. 835 (1961);
Madison County Broadcasters, 30 F.C.C. 694 (1961); Veterans Broadcasting Co.,
29 F.C.C. 83 (1960); Monocacy Broadcasting Co., 28 F.C.C. 301 (1960); History-
land Radio, 28 F.C.C. 69 (1960); Enterprise Co., 24 F.C.C. 271 (1958); Tele-
vision East Bay, 22 F.C.C. 1477 (1957).
2" Community Telecasting Corp., 32 F.C.C. 923 (1962); Sucesion Luis Pirallo-
Castellanos, 26 F.C.C. 109 (1959); Great Lakes Television, Inc., 25 F.C.C. 470
(1958); Toledo Blade Co., 25 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
There have been aberrational cases, however, where diversification played a
more significant role. For example, in McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239
F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957), the Commission
awarded a non-newspaper applicant a television construction permit even though
it felt that the competing newspaper-affiliated applicant held a definite technical ad-
vantage by reason of its vast experience and record of public service.
6 Grants Broadcasting Co., 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 657 (1964); Lewistown
Broadcasting Co., 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 23 (1964) ; Burlington Broadcasting Co.,
21 P & F RADIO REG. 786 (1961); Louis W. Skelly, 18 P & F RADIo REG. 34
(1959); Universal Broadcasting Co., 11 P & F RADIO REG. 569 (1956); Birney
Imes, Jr., 10 P & F RADIO REG. 1192 (1954) ; Southern Newspapers, Inc., 10 P & F
RADIo REG. 59 (1954); Radio Fort Wayne, Inc., 9 P & F RADIO REG. 1221 (1954).
'37 U.S.L.W. 2429 (FCC Jan. 23, 1969).
23 See Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest 379-80 n.88.
2537 U.S.L.W. at 2429.
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be disregarded in comparing the application for renewal with competing
applications for construction permits."0 Granting the license to the suc-
cessful contestant-a citizens group-was based on the grounds that it
was superior in diversification 1 and integration of ownership with manage-
ment.
32
POSSIBLE THEORIES FOR CHALLENGE UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Independent of the "public interest" requirement of the Communica-
tions Act, newspaper ownership of broadcast facilities may be subject to
challenge under section 2 of the Sherman Act 3 and section 7 of the
Clayton Act.84 Section 2 proscribes, inter alia, "attempting to monopolize"
or "monopolizing" any part of interstate commerce.3' Each of these
offenses consists of two elements. The necessary requisites for "monop-
olizing" are (1) monopoly power and (2) the wilful creation, protection,
or extension of that power ;36 whereas, for "attempts to monopolize," (1)
monopoly as a goal and (2) a "specific intent" to monopolize must be
shown.3 7  Cross-media ownership may violate one of these provisions
of the Sherman Act: (1) where a newspaper applies for a broadcasting
license; (2) where a newspaper that already owns a broadcast medium
is guilty of predatory behavior ;31 or (3) where a newspaper that owns
a broadcast medium controls a substantial part of the cross-media market
o Id.
" 37 U.S.L.W. at 1113.2 Id. The FCC ruling is the latest in a prolonged legal battle that has contin-
ued since 1957 when the license was originally granted to WHDH, a subsidiary of
the Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bay Telecasters,
Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 918 (1961).
The dissent in the latest Commission proceeding argued that the reasons for
refusing WHDH's renewal should only be applicable to consideration of original
applications. Commissioner Lee concluded that
[t]o hold otherwise would permit a new applicant to submit a "blue sky"
proposal tailor-made to secure every comparative advantage while the exist-
ting licensee must reap the demerits of hand-to-hand combat in the business
world, and the community it serves....
37 U.S.L.W. at 2429.
3326 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
" 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
35 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
"United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd except
as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
"
7 Turner, Antitrst Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281, 304
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
" Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) ; Kansas City Star
Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
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and attempts to continue its domination even if by generally acceptable
practices.39
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits all mergers and other acquisi-
tions that may either substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.4" Those cross-media mergers between two companies market-
ing the same product in the same geographic market, i.e., horizontal
mergers,41 would seem most susceptible to Clayton 7 challenge. 2
"o United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964). In United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), Judge Wyzanski, relying on the opinion of Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945), condemned practices that, though "honestly industrial," were not "eco-
nomically inevitable."4038 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
1For the traditional definition of a horizontal merger, see Davidow, Conglom-
erate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-Merger Act,
68 CoLum. L. REv. 1231, 1232 (1968).
42 Since the same geographic market is involved, there could, of course, be no
truly conglomerate cross-media acquisitions. But certainly the three general types of
anticompetitive consequences most often condemned in conglomerate mergers-
alteration of the market structure, potential advantages, and an increased oppor-
tunity for anticompetitive behavior-might be considered. See Turner, Congloin-
erate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1313 (1965).
Courts have expressed concern about altering the market structure by loss of
a potential competitor. This concern, however, is primarily directed toward situa-
tions where the merging company is either one of a few potential entrants or is for
some reason unique. Cf. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). Entry
into a lucrative cross-media market would probably be open to any party so long as
licenses are available. But it is arguable that the local newspaper, because of po-
tential efficiencies, is a somewhat unique entrant. Although there would be many
media companies outside the local area that might like to come into the market, they
would not have the local newspaper's inherent advantages. Further, in most con-
glomerate cases, the courts emphasize that entry into the market would be better
if done independently. Id. In the cross-media context, however, it is probable
that if a merger should be barred, independent entry, by applying for a different
license, should likewise be prohibited.
Cross-media mergers may create advantages for both of the merging com-
panies. No longer will it be necessary for the two merging media to purchase ad-
vertising in the other's medium. Further, capital costs may be less, and efficiencies
may be realized by joint use of many physical facilities and personnel. Attractive-
ness to certain advertisers may be enhanced since they can get package rate dis-
counts.
The opportunity for anticompetitive behavior will be increased substantially.
Where a newspaper and a television station merge, predatory pricing, and its milder
counterpart, disciplinary pricing, may result because of the usually high profits
of television stations that could offset newspaper losses from dropping prices.
Also, tie-ins, threatening the loss of a favorable position in the newspaper, and
other pressures may be adopted in order to win advertisers.
For a discussion of conglomerate mergers, see generally Davidow, Conglomerate
Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-Merger Act, 68
CoLum. L. REv. 1231 (1968); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313 (1965).
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Relevant Market
For antitrust purposes, and in particular for purposes of section 2 of
the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act, the impact of restrictive
economic activity is generally measured in the context of some relevant
product and geographic market.43 The starting point here is the identifica-
tion of the interests affected by the common ownership of newspapers and
broadcast stations. There are two primary interests: the consumer's in-
terest in competition in the presentation of ideas and editorial viewpoints
and the advertiser's interest in competition among the media for his busi-
ness. A further breakdown is possible in terms of local news and adver-
tising on one hand and national and regional news and advertising on
the other. The latter problem is obviously less significant since there
are alternative means of reaching the market, and the need for advertisers
to do so by locally oriented media is not as crucial. Furthermore, courts
have uniformly found that the needs of the local market constitute a
sufficient entity for antitrust purposes and have consequently paid little
attention to this problem."
For local advertisers the newspaper is clearly the preferred and there-
fore dominant medium, and it usually commands a very high percentage
of the local advertising expenditures. 5 In addition, broadcast news is
usually brief and condensed and as a result the newspaper offers the
only source of detailed coverage that can be leisurely consumed. For
these reasons, it is generally held that the local newspaper market is itself
a suitable market or submarket."I This does not mean, of course, that
newspaper ownership of, and anticompetitive practices directed at, broad-
cast media are immune from antitrust scrutiny, or even that a broader
' United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (horizontal
merger); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(monopolizing); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 23 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.
Pa. 1964) (attempt to monopolize).
" See, e.g., Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
" In 1962, newspapers considered as a whole controlled 80.2 percent of all local
advertising revenues received by all newspapers, radio, and television stations. See
H. HEPNER, ADVERTISING-COMMUNICATION WITH CONSUMERS 250 (4th ed. 1964).
Radio controlled 11.9 percent and television 7.9 percent. Id. In the same year,
there were 4,653 radio stations, 563 television stations, and approximately 1,749
newspapers. RUCKER 7, 237.
46 Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 4208 (U.S. Mar. 10,
1969); United States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1967),
aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 712 (1968).
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market of local advertising or local news presentation is not an appro-
priate market. Since local newspaper competition is frequently monopolistic
and almost invariably oligopolistic, it is most important that any substi-
tute competition be kept viable and independent, even though it offers only
an outside limit to the newspaper's margin of competitive freedom. Thus,
it has been held that predatory practices by a newspaper against broadcast
media constituted attempted monopoly of the broader market,47 and pre-
sumably it would be held that any non-economically inevitable behavior
that interfered with or discouraged such substitute broadcast competition
could be considered "monopolizing" in violation of section 2.48
The question of whether local news and advertising is a single market
would be directly confronted in cross-media mergers or acquisitions either
under section 7 of the Clayton Act or section 2 (and maybe even section 1)
of the Sherman Act. 9 In theory the question involved is whether broad-
cast media are a viable alternative to or offer a sufficient limitation on
the newspaper's competition decisions. If the answer is in the affirmative,
the market can be defined to include newspapers and broadcast media ;0
if it is not, the contrary will be true."' Obviously either decision is in-
accurate in this area, since the broader definition probably overstates the
broadcast media's importance; whereas, the narrower one ignores it
entirely. 2 Thus, for large local advertisers like department stores or food
stores, the broadcast media offer no realistic alternative to the news-
paper, but for other businesses they may. Actually the decision is not
crucial for merger cases since mergers between significant firms in separate
markets that have competitive overlap may still violate section 7. Never-
theless, the United States Supreme Court has, for other reasons to be
discussed below,54 tended recently in such situations to merge the firms
""Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
48 Cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (discouraging competition in used
machinery market by a restrictive leasing policy).
49 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
Cf. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
r'Cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd
except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
" See generally Turner.
r In United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964), Justice Harlan,
in his dissenting opinion, noted that the Court was accepting the Government's argu-
ment that wherever there is competition there is a "line of commerce." Id. at 471
n.6.
See the "numbers game" discussion, pp. 807-08 infra.
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into a single line of commerce for section 7 purposes, and there is some
likelihood it would do so here."
The geographic market is generally the local metropolitan area.
Usually it is of no consequence that newspapers and broadcast media
from nearby cities reach the local market since they will not carry sub-
stantial amounts of local advertising and will not offer significant local
news coverage.5 6
Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Monopolizing
Monopoly power has often been defined as the power "to raise prices
or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so."5 This means that
a firm has freedom, without regard to competitive restraints in the markets,
to choose within some range the price it will set and thus maximize its
profits. By contrast, in the truly competitive situation the price is deter-
mined by the interaction of market forces, and it will ordinarily yield the
minimum profit that justifies the investment and labor.
Monopoly power is not legally measured by this criterion. Instead it
is generally inferred or presumed from the share of the market controlled
by a firm. 8 Judge Learned Hand once suggested in dictum that a ninety
percent market share clearly constituted monopoly power, that sixty per-
cent was doubtful, and that thirty per cent was clearly not sufficient. 9
Where the numbers are close, such factors as ease of entry, the size of
other competitors, and the existence of foreign competition may influence
the determination.
The mere possession of monopoly power is not a violation of sec-
tion 2.00 Otherwise natural monopolies-those existing by operation of
"
5United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
" Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 4208 (U.S. Mar. 10,
1969) (joint venture between two newspapers); Kansas City Star Co. v. United
States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957) (attempt to
monopolize and monopolizing in a cross-media market); United States v. Times
Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 712
(1968) (merger between two daily newspapers).
" American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
" See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964),
aff'd except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
"' United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
" See United States v. International Harvester Co., 274.U.S. 693 (1927) ; United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). See generally Levi, The
Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. Cni. L. REv. 153 (1947); Rostow, Monopoly
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law, such as a patent monopoly, and those that emerge victorious from
honest competition-would be in violation. Any abuse of the power,
however, is illegal. 1 Thus, predatory behavior or violations of other
antitrust laws that preserve or enhance the power will constitute monop-
olizing if engaged in by a firm with monopoly power. Such behavior
could consist of tie-in arrangements, 2 refusals to deal with anyone
patronizing a competitor,13 and non-cost-justified package rate discounts. 4
The cases go further, however, and hold that any non-economically in-
evitable market behavior that has the same effects, even though "honestly
industrial" and engaged in by the monopolist's competitors, will also con-
stitute monopolizing. 5 Finally, the cases suggest that such behavior by
a monopolist with respect to a substitute product will similarly constitute
monopolizing of his own market."
Preventing the creation of cross-media monopolies is equally as im-
portant as attacking existing monopolies. This may be done on two
Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose, 43 ILL. L. REv. 745 (1949); Turner
281.
Recently the Antitrust Division intervened in a license renewal hearing for a
television station in Cheyenne, Wyoming, and urged that the FCC deny the appli-
cation. It alleged that the applicant, the owner of almost all the local media, had
monopoly power, but apparently not finding any abuse of such power, it did not
charge that the applicant was guilty of monopolizing. Nevertheless, the Antitrust
Division maintained the license should be denied since it was improper for the
FCC to further a monopolistic situation. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No.
391 (1969).
"1 See, e.g., United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
0
"Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 923 (1957).
" Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
", Radio Fort Wayne, Inc., 9 P & F RADIO REG. 1221 (1954).
'6 E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
Although cost-justified package rate discounts may constitute honestly industrial
but non-economically inevitable behavior, such conduct may be difficult to dem-
onstrate. In Alcoa, the Court considered the company's constant expansion of
capacity in anticipation of increased demand and before others could enter the field
to be sufficient. 148 F.2d at 430-31. Of course, it is arguable that in the cross-media
context increasing the size of a newspaper or the length of time on the air for a
broadcast station would be similar to the behavior in Alcoa. Furthermore, enlarging
the staff of advertising salesmen is arguably adequate. The three latter types of
activity, however, seem to be in reality economically inevitable. The size of the
paper or the length of time on the air will probably not be increased until advertising
revenue so justifies. With respect to the advertising salesmen, they probably will
be employed only after the demand demonstrates the need for enlarging the staff.
68 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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occasions-when newspapers merge with broadcast media and when news-
papers apply for broadcast licenses. Of course, across-media merger may
also be vulnerable to challenge as a combination to monopolize under sec-
tion 2,67 a combination in restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman
Act,"8 and as a horizontal merger unlawful under section 7 of the Clayton
Act.
In 1962, newspapers controlled 80.2 percent of all newspaper, radio
and television local advertising; whereas radio controlled 11.9 percent
and television 7.9 percent.69 Assuming the existence of a hypothetical
metropolitan area with these percentages, if there were only one newspaper
and it merged or applied for a broadcast license, it would have monopoly
power. Although this is probably the only instance where the application
alone will be subject to a- monopolizng charge, there would probably have
to be a competing applicant for there to be an abuse of such monopoly
power. Where a city has several newspapers controlled by different
parties with approximately equal local advertising revenues, a merger
between one newspaper and a broadcast station will probably not give it
monopoly power because even if the newspaper already controls all other
broadcast media, the maximum share of the market it could control would
be approximately sixty percent. Of course, if monopoly power is found,
the act of merging with the broadcaster would probably constitute a
sufficient "plus" element.
Attempt to Monopolize
If the newspaper ownership of broadcast facilities does not constitute
a sufficient share of the market to presume monopoly power, the charge
of attempting to monopolize might offer an alternative basis for challenge.
Here the attention will be focused on whether there is some chance of
achieving a monopoly and the existence of a "specific intent" to monop-
olize.70 A showing of non-economically inevitable behavior will be in-
adequate to demonstrate such intent.
In a metropolitan area with the percentage shares for each of the
media assumed above-newspapers 80.2 percent, radio 11.9 percent, and
television 7.9 percent-numerous types of egregious behavior could be
practiced effectively by the newspaper-owned media. In most cities there
'7 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).08 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
"See H. HEPNER, ADVERTISING-CREATIVE COMMUNICATION WITH CONSUMERS
250 (4th ed. 1964).
70 See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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will rarely be more than two competing newspapers. Often the two will
be a morning and an afternoon and therefore even if they are not owned
by the same party certain advertisers of necessity will have to advertise
in both. Such advertisers might be pressured into accepting tie-in arrange-
ments that force them to advertise with the broadcast media to be able
to advertise in the newspaper. 71 Further, the advertisers may be told that
advertising with competing media may result in a refusal to sell by the
newspaper,72 or there may be threats of loss of favorable position in
the newspaper.73 To assure the effectiveness of such behavior, the media
may offer rebates on advertising 74 or non-cost-justified package rate dis-
counts.7' Finally, the cross-media owner may engage in blatant predatory
pricing to drive the media competitor, whether newspaper or broadcaster,
out of business. 76
The combination of reprehensible behavior sufficient to constitute
the requisite "specific intent" is uncertain. In Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States,77 the Court found an attempt-to-monopolize violation where the
only local newspaper refused to sell advertising to businesses that adver-
tised with a neophyte radio station. The Court realized that since the
newspaper had such a strong competitive position, the newspaper's con-
duct would eventually lead to the extinction of the radio station. Of course,
the newspaper could presumably have further been charged with monop-
olizing. Generally, in the attempted monopoly cases, where the market
share is not large enough to presume monopoly power, the conduct evi-
dencing the attempt and the market share must be sufficient to demonstrate
a "dangerous probability""8 of successfully obtaining monopoly power.
Furthermore, it seems that, notwithstanding the general rule that the
market share is relatively insignificant in attempt cases, the seriousness
"' Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 923 (1957).
"Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
"'Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 656 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
"See Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp.
125 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd as modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 83,3 (1961).
See Radio Fort Wayne, Inc., 9 P & F RArio REG. 1221 (1954).
. See United States v. Lindsay-Schaub Newspapers, Inc., 1967 Trade Cas.
72,085 (E.D. Ill.).
" 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
"'See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946). Pro-
fessor Turner reasons that a refined analysis of the market is unnecessary in
attempt cases because the type of conduct sufficient to show the requisite "specific
intent" is without "social or economic justification." Turner 305.
[Vol. 47
"CROSS-MEDIA" OWNERSHIP .
and the extent of egregious behavior must increase as the market share
decreases in order to demonstrate the requisite probability of success.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act-Horizontal Mergers
Section 7 of the Clayton Act requires a predictive judgment as to the
probability that a merger may substantially lessen competition."9 But
the difficulties that could result from attempting factually to justify such
a conclusion are numerous. A gigantic record might be produced and
after several months of trial it might not be clear whether the trial judge
could say competition would be substantially lessened. Thus, the Supreme
Court has developed a short-hand approach. Where a market is already
heavily concentrated, a merger between leading firms therein that pro-
duces a firm with a large percentage of the market will presumptively
lessen competition or make out a prima facie case with the difficult
burden to demonstrate the contrary on the defendant.8 ° The idea is that
competitors in a concentrated market eschew price competition and adopt
a "live and let live" attitude. The higher the concentration, the greater the
chance they will cooperate and behave like monopolists to achieve the
highest possible profit consistent with other objectives, such as discour-
aging entry or avoiding governmental scrutiny. Mergers facilitating such
concentration are presumptively anticompetitive.8"
Furthermore, even where there are numerous small firms in a market,
the Court might not undertake a detailed consideration of the economic
results of a merger because approving such a merger might lead to re-
quests for authorization of mergers creating a firm of a similar size.82
Allowing such a pattern of mergers would tend to create a tight oligopoly
wherein the parties, realizing that any price decrease or increase will be
followed by their competitor, would individually maximize profits. 3
Although the minimum percentage market share for a merger to be
held presumptively unlawful is not known, the Supreme Court has held
that 30 percent is sufficient.8 4 Obviously the identification of the market
is of utmost importance here. Presumably, as noted earlier, a market
could be defined to include all local commercial advertising.8 5 Applying
° 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
"United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).81Id
82 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
83Id. See generally Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285 (1967).8
,United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
See pp. 801-03 supra.
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the 30 percent test in such a market would make many cross-media
mergers prima facie unlawful.
Since it is very rare that a metropolitan area is served by more than
three newspapers, in the hypothetical market that we assumed above,
where newspapers controlled 80.2 percent of the local advertising, radio
11.9 percent and television 7.9 percent, it would be impossible for news-
papers in most cities to merge with a broadcast medium. Obviously, be-
cause of the paucity of the media, almost all are leading f.rms, and even if
a city had three newspapers with approximately equal revenue, the ac-
quired broadcaster would only have to control about 3 percent of the
market for the percentage to be "undue." 6 In cities with only one or two
significant newspapers, all mergers by these papers would usually create
a firm that would exceed the thirty percent line. It is arguable that the
courts either might be stricter in finding the required percentage, because
the products are substitutes, or might be less concerned because of the
oligopoly and entry problems." Of course, though the total percentage
after the merger is sufficient, the acquired broadcast media, especially radio
88 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
sI Entry into the local advertising market is generally very difficult because of
either economic or technical problems. Radio and VHF television entry is often
limited because the spectrum has become crowded. RUCKER 82, 91-93. Furthermore,
the future establishment of newspapers, AM and FM radio stations, and UHF tele-
vision stations will probably be inhibited because many of these media do not realize
a profit.
Though CATV is not generally a competitor for local advertising, as a potential
entrant its entry problems should be noted. Obtaining a franchise from the
municipality's governing body is the primary requirement. In some cities, franchises
are granted for the exclusive right to wire a part or all of a city for CATV. Of
course, in such cities there will be no competition for strictly CATV advertising.
Even where the franchises are not exclusive, most cities will be unable to support
more than one system. RUCKER 176. The FCC, which assumed jurisdiction over
virtually all CATV systems in 1966, is responsible for an entry barrier of a different
nature. A CATV system that intends to import signals from distant stations into
the primary service area of a station which is in the top one hundred markets is
required to obtain permission from the FCC. RUCKER 178. As a result, in the
larger cities without CATV, one of the few potential competitors that can enter
and compete effectively with existing media is significantly handicapped. Fur-
thermore, even though a non-exclusive CATV system may be approved, the FCC
ruling will present a substantial barrier to additional entries into a market which cain
support more than one CATV system. Regardless of whether the FCC continues
this policy, it should accept the responsibility of preventing the creation of further
cross-media complexes involving CATV. Statistics indicate that the newspapers
are rapidly developing such systems. See note 3 supra. Of course, even more ob-jectionable than newspaper ownership of CATV would be television ownership of
CATV. Such ownership would eliminate competition -for advertising between tech-
nically identical media and would" circumvent the duopoly rules that restrict owner-
ship to one television station in the same market. 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a) (1) (1968).
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stations, might control such a small market share that the effect of the
merger may be de minimis.A8 In such instances the merger would prob-
ably be immune to challenge.
In markets where newspapers do not control such a high percentage
of the local advertising revenue, it is arguable that the market may be
juggled to include only the two types of merging media in order to show
the necessary combined market share. In United States v. Continental
Can Co.,"9 the Court identified a submarket of only glass and can con-
tainers even though there were other types of containers that competed for
the same end uses. Probably the use of this analysis would be most
desirable in challenging newspaper-radio mergers. Yet the two media are
not as substantially interchangeable as in Continental Can, and thus
modifying the market definition might not be a viable alternative.
Although a cross-media merger may not be susceptible to challenge
under the so-called "numbers game" approach, the courts may still block
the merger if future approval of similar cross-media mergers might fur-
ther the creation of an oligopoly.90 But to apply this reasoning, the news-
papers would have to be merging with broadcasters whose portion of the
local advertising revenue is not de minimis. Of course, only small radio
stations and UHF television stations would likely have such an insig-
nificant revenue from advertising. For example, if in the local market
there were three newspapers and three television stations with substantial
advertising revenue and one of each were merging, the first merger might
not produce a firm with thirty percent of the market, but the courts would
probably deny approval."'
Once a cross-media merger is found vulnerable to Clayton 7 challenge,
it is very unlikely that the acquiring company can avail itself of a success-
ful defense. Usually the courts will feel the potential evils outweigh any
benefits engendered by such mergers. 92 The only possible defense available
might be that one of the merging media is a "failing company."93 Recent
cases, however, show that this is difficult to demonstrate, 4 and the un-
" See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (Rome
Cable).89378 U.S. 441 (1964).
"'See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-44 (1962).
"1United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
02 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 337 (1962).
"'See generally Comment, An Updating of the "Failing Company" Doctrine
in the Amended Section 7 Setting, 61 MicH. L. REv. 566 (1963).
" Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 4208 (U.S. Mar. 10,
1969).
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successful firm must be on the verge of bankruptcy before it can take
advantage of this defense. 5 Mere unprofitability is not sufficient, and even
if a company is in the required financial condition, it must show that it
has fully explored the possibilities of self-help."
SUGGESTED SOLUTION
The foregoing analysis has indicated that in a substantial number
of cities, newspaper ownership of broadcast facilities may constitute a
violation of the antitrust laws. Though the Antitrust Division has pri-
mary responsibility for enforcement of the antitrust laws, the FCC in
applying the "public interest" requirement of the Communications Act
should analyze the competitive effects of cross-media ownership by appli-
cation of the economic analysis and tests developed under section 2 and
section 7." It should do this when granting new licenses, renewing exist-
ing licenses and approving license transfers 8 The Commission has ex-
pertise in the communications area that uniquely qualifies it as the forum
to consider the antitrust implications. In addition, the costs of bringing
separate antitrust actions against the media owners would probably limit
"See Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Div. Merger Guidelines, BNA ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. No. 363 (1968).
96 Id.
Senator Clarence Dill, who wrote the Communications Act, recently stated:
If I had dreamed that newspapers would acquire radio and television
stations, I would have written a prohibition into the act. Certainly news-
papers which occupy monopoly positions in a city should not be permitted
also to own radio and television stations. This country cannot afford to have
monopoly over public opinion any more than it can afford to have monopoly
in industry.
Pearson & Anderson, Washington Merry-Go-Rouind, News and Observer (Ra-
leigh, N.C.), Mar. 26, 1969, at 4, col. 7.
" The FCC could apply the antitrust laws either by administrative decision or
by using its statutory rule-making powers. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1009 (1964).
The Antitrust Division filed memoranda recently in two instances urging that
the FCC adopt this procedure. In Beaumont, Texas, the owner of the only two
daily newspapers sought permission from the FCC to acquire the television license
of the largest of three stations in the area. The Antitrust Division brief argued
that the acquisition would be invalid under Clayton 7. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. No. 357 (1968). The Division also sought to block the television license
renewal of Frontier Broadcasting Company in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The company
controls most of the local media in that city-an AM station, the only daily and
Sunday newspapers, and a construction permit for the city's second FM station-
in addition to the television station. The Antitrust Division argued that the
licensee had monopoly power, but did not argue that the monopoly power was in
Violation of seciton 2. It based its opposition to renewal on the impropriety of per-
perpetuating a monopoly in the licensing procedure. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REp. No. 391 (1969).
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suits to larger metropolitan areas. Scrutiny by the FCC would virtually
eliminate the necessity of the Antitrust Division's originating actions in
the courts."
Such a procedure seems consistent with United States v. Radio
Corporation of America,10 0 where Chief Justice Warren wrote: "[I]n a
given case the Commission might find that antitrust considerations alone
would keep the statutory standard from being met . . . ."10 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that where the principles and
goals of antitrust policy and the public interest requirement applied by a
regulatory agency are closely related, it is both permissible and desirable
for the agency to refer to antitrust guidelines.0 2
After the FCC determines that there is an antitrust violation, the
question arises as to what it should do. By combining the usual antitrust
remedies' 0 3 with the Commission's statutory powers to grant, 104 modify,'0 5
" An action by the Antitrust Division before consideration of the matter by the
FCC would raise the issue of primary jurisdiction. Cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
applied to determine whether a matter shall be considered by a regulatory agency
before the matter comes under judicial scrutiny. Broadcasters are not specifically
exempted from the antitrust laws, and it has been held that they are subject to
prosecution under them. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334
(1959). Furthermore, if an antitrust proceeding is pending, California v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962), seems to hold that action by an agency is in-
valid. That case involved the Natural Gas Act, but the dissent said:
The holding ... is not limited to Federal Power Commission proceedings
... and the Court appears to lay down a pervasive rule.., that seemingly
will henceforth govern every agency action involving matters with respect
to which the antitrust laws are applicable and antitrust litigation is then
pending in the courts.
Id. at 491.
100358 U.S. 334 (1959).
201 Id. at 351.
101 Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S.
238 (1968); accord, Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 37
U.S.L.W. 1005 (U.S. 1969); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
10. Sherman Act § 4 and Clayton Act § 15 confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts "to prevent and restrain violations of this act. . . ." 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 25
(1964). The Supreme Court has understood its power under this statute to em-
brace "such orders and decrees as are necessary or appropriate" to enforce the
statute. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 344 (1904). The types
of remedies ordered under these sections of the Sherman and Clayton Acts are:
(1) enjoining the bad practices; (2) depriving the defendant of the fruits of his
anticompetitive actions; and (3) divestiture. See, e.g., United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 88 S. Ct. 1496 (1968), United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
10448 Stat. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1964).
10 66 Stat. 718, 47 U.S.C. § 316 (1964).
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or revoke.. 6 licenses, a satisfactory solution balancing public and private
interests can be reached in most situations.
Original Applications
Designing a remedy for the problem of granting new broadcast licenses
to newspaper owners where such an award would violate antitrust laws
can best be handled by considering separately the situations where there
is a sole applicant and where there is more than one applicant.
Generally the approach of the FCC has been to grant a license to the
sole applicant without considering other media connections. 07 As in the
comparative proceeding, it has adhered to the "relatively best" orienta-
tion, and since there is no rival with which the applicant is compared,
this party invariably "wins."' ' Where there are antitrust violations,
however, the license generally should not be granted even if there is
only one applicant.
Of course, concededly, under some circumstances a party should still
be permitted to expand its holdings in the mass media. In those few com-
munities of the country, for example, which presently enjoy no television
services or receive but one station, there are cogent factors in favor of
enfranchising an affiliated' 0 party that alone applies for an outlet. As
an existing operator in the mass media field, with established news gather-
ing and advertising placement facilities, this party can rely upon sub-
stantial economies of dual operation when embarking upon the television
venture. If other outlets are technically allocable to the community, when
the advertising revenue increases, other unaffiliated applicants can come
in.
1 1 0
In a comparative proceeding where an unaffiliated applicant is com-
peting, the obvious solution is to award the license to this party. Of course,
if the unaffiliated contestants are unqualified the same considerations apply
as when there is a sole applicant.
Renewals
Until recently the FCC gave little weight to diversification principles
in determining whether to renew the license of an established party or
100 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1964).
107 Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest 382.
.0. See, e.g., Birney Imes, Jr., 10 P & F RADIO REG. 1192 (1954).
... An affiliated party is one who has local newspaper connections. An un-
affiliated party does not.
110 Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest 395.
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to enfranchise competing applicants.111 However, as noted previously, in
WHDH, Inc."2 the statutory requirement that the renewal applicant
serve the "public interest" was used as a basis to deny renewal when the
incumbent had only an average record of serving the public interest, and
the license was awarded to one of the contestants partially because it had
no affiliations with other media.'
Although the result reached in this one instance was satisfactory, it
apparently was unprecedented.1 4 and there is no reason to believe that a
massive assault on newspaper owned stations will follow if the diversifica-
tion criterion continues to be looked upon as only one consideration.
Again, a full scale inquiry by the FCC into antitrust implications would
be more suitable, and when violations are found, appropriate action in
the form of either denial of the renewal application or contingent renewal
should be taken.
Where the incumbent is competing with other applicants for a particu-
lar license, and the comparative proceeding indicates that an unaffiliated
contestant is qualified, this party should receive the license. This result
occurred in WHDH and apparently no consideration was given to the
potential economic burden to the incumbent owner. At any rate, a better
result would be to design a decree whereby the unaffiliated contestant would
purchase the physical facilities from the former holder of the license at
a reasonable price set by the FCC. Of course, the incumbent would have
the option not to sell.
Where there are no other applicants and in effect the incumbent is
the sole applicant, even more difficult problems arise. It would clearly
be inequitable to require that, regardless of whether there was a buyer,
the incumbent abandon operations. Furthermore, even if there were a
buyer, the price offered would probably be unconscionably low since the
broadcast owner would be selling at a "forced" sale. An equitable solu-
11 For example, in Hearst Radio, Inc., 6 P & F RADIo REG. 994 (1951), the
Commission was confronted with the choice of renewing a party with a mediocre
past programming record or enfranchising a highly qualified newcomer. Although
finding that the newcomer was superior on major comparative criteria, and that,
in contrast to the newcomer's unaffiliation, the incumbent controlled one television,
three AM, and two FM stations, plus vast newspaper interests, the Commission
renewed on the basis of the "clear advantage of continuing the established
[party].... ." Id. at 1034. Of course, not all of the incumbent's media were in the
same city, but the situation was nevertheless deplorable.
37 U.S.L.W. 2429 (FCC Jan. 23, 1969).
"'Id.
... See Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest 379-80 n.88.
19691
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tion would seem to be to renew the license for three years" or until the
operator can sell the station to a qualified purchaser at a reasonable price,
whichever is sooner."' Where questions arise, as they inevitably will,
as to what is a reasonable price and who is a qualified purchaser, the FCC
will be the final arbiter. Of course, the result might be that the newspaper
owner may continue to operate the station forever, but at least there is a
chance that his cross-media ownership might be severed.
Tran4ers
Although the "public interest" standard also governs the transfer sec-
tion of the Act," 7 a 1952 amendment provides that a transferee must be
considered as if it were the sole transferee." 8 But since no comparisons
to other possible transferees are required, this should not inhibit the appli-
cation of section 7. Of course, denial of the transfer application will
prevent the completion of the transaction and is therefore an adequate
solution." 9
CONCLUSION
The FCC, acting under the mandate of serving the "public interest,"
should forthrightly assert that future grants, renewals and transfers of
broadcast licenses will be scrutinized in the light of section 2 of the
... Licenses are generally renewed for a period of three years. See Hale & Hale,
Competition or Control II: Radio and Television Broadcasting, 107 U. PA. L. Rnv.
585, 587 (1959).
... The FCC can accomplish this by use of its statutory right to renew licenses
for up to three years. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1964). A similar remedy was suggested
by the Antitrust Division when the television license of Frontier Broadcasting came
up for renewal. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 391 (1969). For the
factual context of this request, see note 98 supra.1" 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1964).
... [T]he Commission may not consider whether the public interest, con-
venience, and necessity might be served by the transfer, assignment, or dis-
posal of the permit or license to a person other than the proposed transferee
or assignee.
48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1964).
In the past the Commission had considered the relation of the price paid to the
value of the station, the qualifications of the transferee, and benefits to the public
deriving from the grant. Much of this scrutiny had been dropped, however, even
prior to the 1952 amendment. See Note, Radio and Television Station Transfers:
Adequacy of Supervision Under the Federal Communications Act, 30 IND. L.J. 351
(1955). Some writers have felt that the amendment may limit inquiry to the
broadcast qualifications of the transferee. Wall & Jacob, Communications Act
Anendnents, 1952-Clarity or Ambiguity, 41 GEo. L.J. 135, 153 (1953).
11. This was the remedy suggested by the Antitrust Division when a newspaper-
owned company in Beaumont, Texas, sought to have a license transferred to it.
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 357 (1968).
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Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. Certainly in the past it
was somewhat intimidated by Congress into its passivity, 2 ' but it is not
too much to say that the time has come for the FCC
to show some intestinal fortitude and protect the linchpin of any demo-
cratic society from private domination by insuring a free, competitive,
and independent multitude of voices in the communications industry.' 2'
Furthermore, should the FCC not accept this responsibility, the Congress
should formally amend the Communications Act thereby directing the
Commission to dispose of licenses in light of the antitrust laws and de-
cisions. Many may retort that the expense of such inquiries will be too
great, but the reply must be that the cost cannot be too great if it insures
the freedom of the press.
WILLIAM H. LEWIS, JR.
An Analysis of the Enforceability of Marital Contracts
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment will analyze the treatment of marital contracts by the
North Carolina courts. The focus is upon contracts in the context of a
marriage rather than upon either contracts or domestic relations alone.
A broader question, however, is posed: Is the law of contracts the most
meaningful method available for the analysis and expression of public
policy concerning marital contracts?
A recent example of the judicial approach to marital contracts is found
in Matthews v. Matthews.' The issue was the enforceability of an alleged
marital contract entered into after twelve years of marriage. Fourteen
years after the date of the purported contract an absolute divorce had
been entered, and the plaintiff-husband had petitioned for a sale and parti-
tion of lands that he and his defendant-wife had held as tenants in common.
She produced the alleged contract signed by plaintiff in which plaintiff
120 In the early 1950's, Congress considered amending the Communications Act
to prohibit discrimination against newspapers when considering applications for
broadcast licenses. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 2326, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. (1952).
Fortunately, no such law was ever enacted.
2' Flynn, Antitrust and the Newspapers: A Comment on S. 1312, 22 VAND. L.
REV. 103, 125 (1968). See generally Johnson, The Media Barons and the Public
Interest, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1968, at 43.
'2 N.C. App. 143, 162 S.E.2d 697 (1968).
1969]'
